

## ANCHORING PERSON

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1. *Kaplanian anchoring*. In languages like English, grammatical person is anchored uniformly to the speech context ( $c_{@}$  for short) in indirect speech reports, cf. (1): the personal pronouns in the reported clause are anchored exactly as those in the matrix clause. On the other hand, person anchoring is shifted to the reported context in a directly reported clause, cf. (2). (We leave aside ‘monstrous’ languages, on which see Schlenker 2003, Anand & Nevins 2004 a.o. NB: coindexing in (1)-(2) is meant as a pre-theoretical notational device.)

- (1) You<sub>j</sub> told me<sub>k</sub> that you<sub>j</sub> hate me<sub>k</sub>.  
(2) You<sub>j</sub> told me<sub>k</sub>: “I<sub>j</sub> hate you<sub>k</sub>”.

According to a fairly widespread view, grammatical person is anchored to the AUTHOR and HEARER coordinates of a kaplanian context (Kaplan 1989). More precisely, a context  $c$  is a tuple of coordinates  $\langle c_a, c_h, c_s, c_t \dots \rangle$  ( $c_a$  the author,  $c_h$  the hearer,  $c_s$  and  $c_t$  the situation and time of the context); indexicals, including personal pronouns, have a non-trivial character, i.e. a non-constant function from contexts to intensions. The difference between (1) and (2) can be explained in the following terms: while indirect speech *say* expresses a relation between an individual and a proposition ((3), ignoring the GOAL and EVENT arguments), direct speech *say* expresses a relation between an individual and the character of the reported clause, cf. (4).

- (3)  $\llbracket \text{say}_{IS} \rrbracket = \lambda c. \lambda w. \lambda p_{st}. \lambda x. [\text{COMMITTED}(p)(x)]$   
(4)  $\llbracket \text{say}_{DS} \rrbracket = \lambda c. \lambda w. \lambda d_{\langle c, st \rangle}. \lambda x. \exists c' [\text{COMMITTED}(d)(c')(x) \ \& \ x = c'_a]$

Thus, in (1) the characters of the indexicals contained in the embedded clause are interpreted relative to the same context as the indexicals of the main clause, that is,  $c_{@}$ . In (2), instead, the indexicals in the directly reported clause are interpreted relative to the existentially quantified context introduced by the matrix verb, whose AUTHOR coordinate is identified with the matrix subject: whence the obligatory shifting.

2. *De re intrusion and source situations*. In the indirect report (5), the subject of the embedded clause, *John’s dog*, is anchored (*de re*) to the perspective of the AUTHOR of  $c_{@}$ ; this is impossible in the direct report (6), so that the reported clause conveys a contradictory belief (since John’s dog has an owner in Mrs Ross’s doxastic state, it cannot be a stray dog in the same doxastic state). That is, the obligatory shifting of person anchoring in direct speech reports correlates with the impossibility of ‘*de re* intrusion’.

- (5) Mrs Ross claims that John’s dog is a stray dog.  
(6) Mrs. Ross claims: “John’s dog is a stray dog”.

Let us assume that the *de re* definite description contains a variable for the source situation (with situations defined as in Kratzer 1989; see McKenzie n.d. for recent discussion). This variable can be valued as the situation coordinate of the speech context  $c_{@s}$  in indirect speech reports, while it cannot be valued as  $c_{@s}$  in the case of direct speech.

3. *Person agreement and finiteness*. McKenzie (n.d.) argues that in so called switch-reference languages, reference marking across conjoined clauses does not actually keep track of the referent of the clausal subjects, but rather, of (non)identity of the Austinian topic situation of the conjoined clauses. Subjects are involved in that their source situation variable is identified with the local topic situation.

This insight opens a new perspective on person agreement with the subject, as exemplified in many Indo-European languages. First person indicates reference to an (atomic or plural)

individual of which the AUTHOR of  $c@$  ( $c@_a$ ) is an individual part; second person indicates reference to an (atomic or plural) individual of which the HEARER of  $c@$  ( $c@_h$ ), but not the AUTHOR, is an individual part (see a.o. Harbour 2016, 68 ff.). Then, first /second person subject agreement indicates an overlapping between the topic situation and the speech situation (since individuals are parts of situations), while third person agreement indicates non-overlapping.

This view allows us to rethink the defectiveness of person agreement with the subject in the non-finite clauses of many many Indo-European languages. Let us assume, building on Borer (1989), that the topic situation of such non-finite clauses is obligatorily anaphoric to the topic situation of the superordinate clause, rather than being related to the speech situation  $c@s$ : it follows that person agreement is irrelevant, and the subject referent of the non-finite clause necessarily overlaps with the topic situation of the main clause in at least one participant. Note that the non-subject arguments of the non-finite clause, being unrelated to the topic situation, are not anaphoric and can be unproblematically anchored to the speech context, as exemplified in e.g. (7). (NB:  $s_T$  and  $s_{T'}$  stands for the topic situations of the matrix and non-finite clause respectively.)

- (7) Jean <sub>$s_T$</sub>  a promis de PRO <sub>$s_{T'}$</sub>  m'aider.  
 $s_T$  does not overlap  $c@s$   $\Rightarrow$  third person agreement  
 $s_{T'}$  is anaphoric to  $s_T$   $\Rightarrow$  no person agreement

'Inflected infinitives', as in e.g. European Portuguese, remain to be investigated.

4. *Consequences for kaplanian contexts.* From this perspective, a kaplanian context is a speech situation (a part of a possible world), with temporal and spatial coordinates, and the AUTHOR and HEARER are designated *parts of it* (of the type individual). In this respect, temporal overlapping is quite different from person overlapping: while two situations may overlap temporally while being completely distinct situations, any situations that overlap in one participant do have a part in common. Indeed, participants are the only elements that different situations may have in common.

Consider now the well-known case of a written notice like (8):

- (8) You are standing on the Greenwich Meridian line.

How is the HEARER set each time to whoever happens to be reading the notice? The simplest answer seems to be that the work is done by the 2nd person pronoun itself. Then, the 2nd person feature would denote a function from situations to individuals which singles out the HEARER part of a speech situation (with the  $\pm$ value contributing operations on lattices, as in Harbour 2016). In this respect, it would be similar to the role of vocatives: in a root clause, they single out one individual in  $c@$  as HEARER; in direct speech reports, instead, they single out one individual in the situation of the reported context, as exemplified in (9).

- (9) The major looked around and screamed: "Williams<sub>k</sub>! What the hell are you<sub>k</sub> doing?"

If this view could be extended to the 1st person feature (selecting the AUTHOR part of a speech situation), and if we also assumed a temporal trace function from situations to time intervals, (the indexical part of) a kaplanian context could be reduced to just the speech situation itself.

Borer, H. 1989. Anaphoric Agr. In *The Null Subject Parameter*, ed. O. Jaeggli & K. Safir. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

McKenzie, A. n.d.. Swith reference and Austinian topic situations. Ms., Kansas University. Available from <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu>

Harbour, D. 2016. *Impossible persons*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.