

Licensing participants and reflexives

In this talk, I will argue that both participants and reflexive anaphors need to be licensed in syntax through agreement in referential features, based on cross-linguistic data on PCC effects with reflexives and anaphoric agreement in French and Swahili. I propose that the parallel behavior of 1st and 2nd person and anaphoric arguments in PCC effects is due to an inherent referential deficiency, which I model as unvalued [ID]-features (for index or identity) and which underlies their licensing/binding requirements.

The Person-Case Constraint (PCC) states, in its strong variant, that in a ditransitive, where both internal arguments are realized as phonologically weak elements, the direct object must be third person. This is the case in French for instance, which bans DAT > *1/2.ACC combinations in clitic clusters. Interestingly, in French, 3rd person *se* reflexives pattern like 1/2 person for PCC effects, thus banning DAT > *REFL.ACC combinations in clitic clusters. Parallel restrictions on 1/2 person and reflexives in PCC contexts occur cross-linguistically in languages like Catalan (Bonet 1991), Swahili (Riedel 2009), Southern Tiwa (Rosen 1990) or Icelandic (Anagnostopoulou 2005).

- (1) Elle ***te**/***se**/**le** lui présente.
She ***2SG**/***REFL**/**3SG.ACC** 3SG.DAT introduce
She introduces you/herself/him to him/her entirely.

In Swahili and Southern Tiwa, anaphoric agreement (where anaphoricity is expressed on agreement markers) is subjected to the PCC in the same way that 1/2 person agreement is. Furthermore, Baker (2008), based on examples from Chichewa, points out that anaphoric agreement, like person agreement, is restricted to certain categories: it can surface on verbs but not on adjectives, which reinforces to parallelism between the conditions necessary for the licensing of anaphors (including anaphoric agreement) and PERSON. This data suggests that so-called person licensing should be distinguished from [PERSON] agreement (contra Preminger 2017). If this is so, how do 1st and 2nd person elements need to be licensed, and what underlies their common behavior with reflexives in PCC contexts?

1st and 2nd person elements are also known as *indexicals*, and are context-sensitive expressions, whose interpretation is directly dependent on the utterance context. It follows that indexicals and reflexives can both be thought of as referentially dependent elements: they must get their value from something else in the discourse. The referential value of reflexives comes from their antecedent. As for 1st/2nd person elements, it has been argued that they need to be bound or anchored by a syntactic representation of discourse participants, e.g. a Speech Act Projection or Infl (Baker 2008; Gruber 2013; Ritter & Wiltschko 2009, 2014; Speas & Tenny 2003). This is what constitutes their special licensing requirements, and what underlies their common patterning. Indexicals and reflexives thus share the common requirement that they must get referentially valued to be interpretable. I propose that this gets grammaticalized by referential [ID]-features, which play a role in the syntax: PCC effects arise when the [ID]-feature of an indexical or a reflexive cannot be valued by the functional head due to an intervening argument.

References

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