

Lectures on non-representational grammar

Lecture #1: Preliminaries on expressivity

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
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1. A word on expressive words

A very well-known fact about human languages, at least since Karl Bühler's seminal work (Bühler 1934), is that, beyond its obvious representational force, human languages are also extremely powerful devices for communicating features related to the speaker and hearer profiles:



[Bühler's triangle]

- (1) **Expressivity:** Here, all non-representational aspects of human language will be called *the expressive dimension* (or dimensions).

Let's start stating the obvious:

- (2) **The obvious:** All human languages have expressive words.

The discourse participant profiles refer to many aspects of their emotional states but also of their placement in context. Thus, many *expressive words* in natural language conventionally express something about discourse participants, their emotions or attitudes and their contexts.

My empirical realm for these three intense days:

Attitude indicators: many words conventionally communicate emotional attitudes regarding entities, events or situations (e.g., pure expressives like *puta/bendita* 'damn', *puta* 'fuck', *mierda* 'shit', etc.).

Addressee forms: many words conventionally communicate respect (or even disrespect) to the hearer by the speaker's part (e.g., the *vos/usted* 'you._{INFORMAL} / you._{FORMAL}' distinction in the pronominal paradigm and other forms of honorification like the Spanish *don/doña*).

Register / slurs: many words conventionally characterize the local /non-local context of the speaker (e.g., register alternations like *cerveza/birra*, 'beer/beer._{INFORMAL}', *trabajo/laburo* 'work/work._{INFORMAL}', *perro/guau-guau* 'dog/dog._{CHILD-LANG.}', *sudamericano-sudaca*, 'South-American / South-American._{PEJORATIVE}', etc.).

Epithets: Mere insults like in binominals of the following type *ese puto de Andrés* 'that f...Andrés'

Yet, you should have in mind that *context* here means **something more than mere local context** (i.e., the immediate context in which speech takes place). There are words that place the speaker into their *cultural / ideological dimension* (in the Bajtinian's sense):

- | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|----|-------------|----------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|
| (3) | Andrés | es | (un) | puto | / | sudaca |
| | Andrés | is | (a) | homosexual _{PEJORATIVE} | | South-American _{PEJORATIVE} |

Here the slur words tell us that *the speaker is in a context in which a homophobic or xenophobic stereotype is in force* (see Orlando and Saab 2020a). Insofar as these words also characterize *speakers and their contexts*, the rubric of *expressive words* is also appropriated here and I will use it in what follows.


The linguistic importance of expressivity has been always under suspicion, both in the linguistic and in the analytic philosophy traditions (on the latter, see section 2). In linguistics, even for those who adopted Bühler's triangle, e.g., some of the Prague School members, representation/ideation is the primary function of language (cf. and the same is true in the United States tradition from Sapir to Chomsky). Just as illustration, Trubetzkoy claimed that **phonology is, essentially, representative phonology**. Phonemes are not meaningful but contribute to conceptual distinctions, which are crucial for world representation. Thus, when it comes to bilabial consonants, the *voice/voiceless* opposition in Spanish property is differential (in Saussurean terms):

- | | | | | |
|-----|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (4) | a. | Phonological context: /_áta/ | | |
| | b. | /báta/ | vs. | /páta/ |
| | | _____ | | _____ |
| | | ‘set of differential features that give us the concept
λx.Coat(x)’ | | ‘set of differential features that give us the concept
λx.Coat(x)’ |

This is not always the case. Consider Rioplatense palatals:

- | | | | |
|-----|----|--------------------------------------|-----|
| (5) | a. | /ʃó/ | ‘I’ |
| | | _____ | |
| | | ‘the speaker of c’ | |
| | c. | Phonetic variants: yo: [ʃó] vs. [ʒó] | |

Trubetzkoy (1939): Although free phonological variation does not contribute to representation, this does not imply absence of any meaning contribution. In the usual case, *free variation makes a stylistic contribution*. E.g., in the domain of palatals in Rioplatense, free variation characterizes the social type of the speaker



Similarly, Bally [1941] argued that that, even when emotion is crucial in language (not less than representation), its effects must be deduced as properties of the Saussurean *parole*, not of the *langue*. Indeed, he also called *stylistic* to the research program of understanding emotion in language. To this claim, Jakobson reacted as follows:

“This point of view is disproved by the linguistic facts [Bally’s viewpoint, AS]. An overwhelming proportion of the mechanisms of affective language are no less collective and no less conventional than the mechanisms of intellectual language. Every community of speakers has two closely linked language systems: on the one hand the intellectual system [...], and on the other the affective system, the body of essential conventions that allow the members of a given community to express their feelings to each other (see Marty 1908).”

[Jakobson 1990: 100, see Foolen 2022 for a brief but important overview on this debate]

But as far as I can tell, Hejlsmslev [1943] was the first attempt of offering a formal theory of expressive meanings in the structuralist tradition (in its formalist, as opposed to functionalist, version).


Hejmslev’s thesis: the linguistic sign is a mathematical function, not a psychological association (*pace* Saussure 1916).

- (6) a. $1 + 1$
 b. $(1 + 1) + 1$
 c. $((1 + 1) + 1) + 1$


- (7) a. $E R C$
 b. $(E R C) R C$ [E = Expression, C = Content, R = the sign function]

According to this approach, the sign is embeddable, as any function is in a recursive system. This embedding property gives rise to *additional / secondary / complex meanings*, as the byproduct of what Hejlsmslev called *connotative systems*. After Roland Barthes, this can be modeled as follows for an expressive pair like *sudamericano/sudaca* (lot on slurs today and after):

(8)



(9)



“These meanings [i.e., connotation meanings, AS] are in close communication with culture, knowledge, history; through them, if it is permissible to express this way, the world penetrates the system; ideology would be, in short, the form (in Hjelmslev’s sense) of connotative meanings [...]”
[Barthes [1964]: 77, my translation from Spanish]

The moral of this historical note: expressivity was *mainly* seen as a property of lexical items (except for Barthes, who had other agenda in mind).

2. Meaning dimensions: equals but independents

2.1. *The analytic tradition: human sciences vs semantics*

The analytic tradition initiated by Frege shares with the structuralist/functionalist tradition (at least with the relevant versions of it) the idea that the *tone/style* of words is of a different nature than their descriptive content. For Frege, **the difference is epistemological:**

“[...] it is useful to the poet to have at his disposal a number of different words that can be substituted for one another without altering the thought, but which can act in different ways on the feelings and imagination of the hearer. We may think, e.g., of the words “walk”, “stroll”, “saunter”. These means are also used to the same end in everyday language. If we compare the sentences “This dog howled the whole night” and “This cur howled the whole night”, we find that the thought is the same. The first sentence tells us neither more nor less than does the second. But whilst the word “dog” is neutral as between having pleasant or unpleasant associations, the word “cur” certainly has unpleasant rather than pleasant associations and puts us rather in mind of a dog with a somehow unkempt appearance. Even if it is grossly unfair to the dog to think of it in this way, we cannot say that this makes the second sentence false. True, anyone who utters this sentence speaks pejoratively, but this is not part of the thought expressed. What distinguishes the second sentence from the first is of the nature of an interjection. [...]”

[Frege [1897]: 140]

“It makes no difference to the thought whether I use the word ‘horse’ or ‘steed’ or ‘cart-horse’ or ‘mare’. The assertive force does not extend over that in which these words differ. What is called mood, fragrance, illumination in a poem, what is portrayed by cadence and rhythm, does not belong to the thought.”

[Frege [1918]: 23]

Similar positions nowadays:

“[...] **tone, unlike meaning, does not seem to be a feature of language that speakers negotiate among one another and coordinate on.** Indeed, tone, unlike meaning, does not seem to be something that speakers generally command in virtue of knowing their language or universally respect in their choices of linguistic behavior [...] In short, Frege was right: tone “is not part of the thought expressed.”

[Lepore & Stone 2018: 144, my emphasis]

2.2. Kaplan and the new idea

Against the analytic canon, Kaplan replies:

“Now **here is the new idea**: we can get an equally useful measure of the expressive information that is in a sentence — or, in the case of exclamatories like “ouch” and “oops”, in an expressive standing alone — *by looking at all the contexts at which it, the sentence containing the expressive or the expressive standing alone, is expressively correct.* [...] I claim that “ouch” is an expressive that is used to express the fact that the agent is in pain. What is the semantic information in the word “ouch” on this analysis? The semantic information in the word “ouch” is —more accurately, is represented by— the set of those contexts at which the word “ouch” is expressively correct (since it contains no descriptive information), namely, *the set of those contexts at which the agent is in pain.* That set of contexts represents the semantic information contained in the word “ouch”.”

[Kaplan 1999: 15-16, my emphases]

Examples of use-conditional meanings / Bias (in and beyond exclamatories):¹

(10) **Exclamatories:**

- a. Ouch! It hurts.
- b. Oops! It turned off again.
- c. Alas! The party was cancelled.

(11) **Adjective expressives and epithets:**

- a. Ed refuses to look after Sheila’s **damn** dog.
- b. *Right* after Chuck agreed to help out, **the jerk** boarded a plane for Tahiti.
- c. *Right* after he agreed to help out, **that jerk Chuck** boarded a plane for Tahiti.

[Potts 2005: 158]

Slurs:

- (12) Andrés is (un) sudaca / puto.
Andrés is a South-American_{PEJORATIVE} / homosexual_{PEJORATIVE}

2.3. Implementing Kaplan’s new idea: Potts (2005)

2.3.1. Kaplan + Grice

Without a doubt, Potts (2005) is the first explicit logic under Kaplan’s guide. A first step in Potts’ work is modelling the expressive function of language (and not only this function; more on this latter) in terms of **the key notion of conventional implicature:**

“In some cases, the conventional meaning of the words used will determine what is implicated, besides helping to determine what is said. If I say (smugly), *He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave*, I have certainly committed myself, by virtue of the meaning of my words, to its being the case that his being brave is a consequence of (follows from) his being an Englishman. But while I have said that he is an Englishman and said that he is brave, I do not want to say that I have said (in the favored sense) that it follows from his being an Englishman that he is brave, though I have certainly indicated, and so implicated, that this is so. I do not want to say that my utterance of this sentence would be, *strictly speaking*, false should the consequence in question fail to hold. So ***some implicatures are conventional***, unlike the one with which I introduced this discussion of implicature.”

[Grice 1975 *apud* Potts 2007: 1-2]

¹ *Use-conditional meanings* is the term coined in Gutzmann (2015) and *bias* is the one coined in Predelli (2013). Beyond different implementations in each of these (and other) works, I think that (i) they are different way of naming the same “new idea” in Kaplan, and that (ii) they are synonymous when applied to the relevant taxonomies. I will use both interchangeably.

Conventional implicatures:

- (13) a. CIs are part of the conventional meaning of words.
b. CIs are commitments, and thus give rise to entailments.
c. These commitments are made by the speaker of the utterance ‘by virtue of the meaning of the words he chooses.’
d. CIs are logically and compositionally independent of what is ‘said (in the favored sense)’, i.e., independent of the at-issue entailments.

[Potts 2005: 11]

Canonical examples of CI:

- (14) a. Thora is a baby, but she is quiet.
Descriptive = Thora is a baby, and she is quiet
CI ≈ Babies are not usually quiet
b. Isak is still swimming.
Descriptive = Isak is swimming
CI ≈ Isak was swimming earlier
c. Even Bart passed the test.
Descriptive = Bart passed the test
CI ≈ Bart was among the least likely to pass the test

Yet, it is well-known that these are classic controversial examples of CI (see Bach 1999). For this reason, Potts, prefers to focus on different varieties of expressives:

- (15) a. I’ve just realised I’ve got to work out my bloody sales tax.
(Huddleston & Pullum 2002:36)
Descriptive = I’ve just realized I’ve got to work out my sales tax
CI ≈ I am in a heightened emotional state relating to sales tax
b. Shut that blasted window! (Cruse 1986:272)
Descriptive = Shut that window!
CI ≈ I am in a heightened emotional state relating to that window being open.

Or in appositives, parenthetics and certain type of modal adverbs:

- (16) a. Lance Armstrong, the cyclist, battled cancer.
Descriptive = Lance Armstrong battled cancer
CI = Lance Armstrong is a cyclist
b. Max won the election, which surprised Ali.
Descriptive = Max won the election
CI = That Max won the election surprised Ali
c. Thoughtfully, Jenny picked up her little sister at school.
Descriptive = Jenny picked up her little sister at school
CI = It was thoughtful of Jenny to pick up her little sister at school

2.3.2. The \mathcal{L}_{CI} Logic

In Potts' words, CIs do the following:

- (17) (i) apply a conventional implicature functor to an at-issue ('regular content') argument to form a conventionally implicated proposition; and
 (ii) output the at-issue argument unmodified, as a meaning that is independent of the proposition in (i).


[Potts 2005: 1]

- (18) a. e^a , t^a , and s^a are basic at-issue types for \mathcal{L}_{CI} .
 b. e^c , t^c , and s^c are basic CI types for \mathcal{L}_{CI} .
 c. If σ and τ re at-issue types for \mathcal{L}_{CI} , then $\langle \sigma, \tau \rangle$ is an at-issue type for \mathcal{L}_{CI} .
 d. If σ is an at-issue type for \mathcal{L}_{CI} and τ is a CI type for \mathcal{L}_{CI} , then $\langle \sigma, \tau \rangle$ is a CI type for \mathcal{L}_{CI} .
 e. If σ and τ are at-issue types for \mathcal{L}_{CI} , then $\langle \sigma \times \tau \rangle$ is a producto type for \mathcal{L}_{CI} , a subset of the set of at-issue types for \mathcal{L}_{CI} .
 f. The full set of types for \mathcal{L}_{CI} is the union of the at-issue and CI types for \mathcal{L}_{CI} .

[Potts 2005: 55]


Potts's axioms:

(19)




The metalingual operator \bullet fulfills the function of separating the two meaning dimensions. For cases in which use-conditions are irrelevant, we have standard functional application:


(20)



But CIs can ornament at-issue meanings, like in:
 (21)




The same observation applies to predicate modification:
 (22)




Now, the biggest novelty has to do with the rules that affect CI types. In this sense, the central axiom, at least for the purposes of these lectures, is CI Application.

(23)



(24)




Consider now parenthetics:

(25) Luke—and you’ll never believe this—ate fifty eggs.


This type of editorial comment is not obtained functionally as in the previous example, but simply by letting a conventionally implicated proposition be attached to a constituent that it denotes only in the truth-conditional dimension, which is expressed by the following axiom:

(26)




Isolated CIs will be crucial in our account of argument extension effects (see below and Lecture #3). Now, let’s introduce the last axiom:

(27)



(28)



Semantic trees containing any number of CI meanings are interpreted through the following instruction:

- (29) **Parsetree interpretation:** Let \mathcal{T} be a semantic parsetree with the at-issue term $\alpha: \sigma^a$ on its root node, and distinct terms $\beta_1: \langle s^a, t^c \rangle, \dots, \beta_n: \langle s^a, t^c \rangle$, on nodes in it (extensionally, $\beta_1: t^c, \dots, \beta_n: t^c$). Then the interpretation of \mathcal{T} is the tuple $\langle \llbracket \alpha: \sigma^a \rrbracket^{M_i, g}, \{ \llbracket \beta_1: \langle s^a, t^c \rangle \rrbracket^{M_i, g}, \dots, \llbracket \beta_n: \langle s^a, t^c \rangle \rrbracket^{M_i, g} \} \rangle$ where $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket^{M_i, g}$ is the interpretation function, taking formulae of the meaning language to the interpreted structure M_i , relative to a variable assignment g .

[Potts 2005: 68]

With this system in mind, let's take a first look at epithets and expressive adjectives, as they are analyzed in Chapter 5 of Potts' book. Consider first this initial paradigm:

- (30) a. Ed refuses to look after Sheila's **damn** dog.
 b. *Right* after Chuck agreed to help out, **the jerk** boarded a plane for Tahiti.
 c. Right after he agreed to help out, **that jerk Chuck** boarded a plane for Tahiti.

[Potts 2005: 158]

Here are a list of observations Potts considered that, taken together, allows us to characterize the main features of expressivity (the list is further elaborated in Potts 2007):

- (31) **a. lexicality**
 'expressive meaning is part of the lexical meaning of certain expressions, a semantic quality of words and phrases'

[Löbner 2002: 32]

- b. entailment**
 'the aspects of meaning under discussion, in particular, the semantic information displayed by expressives, can have consequences for the notion of logical validity'

[Kaplan 1999: 13]

- c. speaker orientation**
 'Another characteristic distinguishing expressive meaning from propositional meaning is that it is valid only for the utterer, at the time and place of utterance. This limitation it shares with, for instance, a smile, a frown, a gesture of impatience [. . .].'

[Cruse 1986: 272]

- 'the prior discussion should make us cautious about always accepting as legitimate the demand of a report in indirect discourse'

d. independence

‘Expressive meaning carried by a lexical item in a statement plays no role in determining its truth-conditions.’

[Cruse 1986: 272]

As far as I can tell, *independence* and *speaker orientation* are the more robust properties the entire set of expressives shares:

- (32) A: Sheila’s damn dog is on the couch.
 B: It’s just not true that Sheila’s damn dog is on the couch!

“This sentence cannot be read as negating the speaker’s disapprobation of Sheila’s dog; it is judged false if and only if Sheila’s dog is not on the couch.”


[Potts 2005: 159]

Speaker orientation is also illustrated by examples like this:


- (33) a. Clinton: The damn Republicans should be less partisan.
 b. Bush: Clinton says the damn Republicans should be less partisan.

Let’s then start to see how Potts expressives and epithets are captured under Potts’ logic:

(34)



(35)



[Potts 2005: 166]

“At the level of denotations, the variability of the arguments to an EA [expressive attributes, AS] indicates polymorphism in the domain of the EA meaning. I offer a general lexical entry, on which an EA can take any argument in $\langle \tau^a, t^a \rangle$ to produce a term of type t^c :


(36) $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{damn} \\ \text{bloody} \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \text{fucking} \end{array} \right\} \rightarrow \lambda X. \text{bad}({}^\cap X): \langle \langle \tau^a, t^a \rangle, t^c \rangle$

The nominalizing type shifter ${}^\cap$ is that of Chierchia (1984). When defined extensionally, it takes any function and returns the plural individual composed of all members of the input set. “


[Potts 2005: 167]

For epithets, we only have to make explicit that they take individuals at the at-issue dimensions as arguments:

(37)



(38)



Homework: Explain the ungrammaticality of (i):
 (i) *John is damn.

2.4. Extending \mathcal{L}_C to \mathcal{L}^*_C : McCready (2010)

McCready argues that the facts that Potts' system does not include mixed terms as expressives is an undesirable consequence of the logic and propose an extension called \mathcal{L}^*_C . The basic problem is that mixed terms, like slurs, project out of at-issues operators (i.e., they are independent) and are speaker oriented by default, the two crucial properties for any term to qualify as an expressive:


- (39) a. Juan no es sudaca.
 Juan not is South-American_{PEJORATIVE}
 'Juan is not South-American (pejorative).'
- b. Juan cree que Ana es sudaca.
 Juan believes that Ana is South-American_{PEJORATIVE}
 'Juan believes that Ana is South-American (pejorative).'
- c. Juan puede ser sudaca.
 Juan might be South-American_{PEJORATIVE}
 'Juan might be South-American (pejorative).'
- d. ¿Es sudaca Juan?
 is South-American_{PEJORATIVE} Juan
 'Is Juan South-American (pejorative)?'

In Potts' machinery, given the axioms of logic, there is no way to semantically compose a derivation containing mixed expressions. For this reason, McCready proposes to enrich both the semantic types and the set of axioms of \mathcal{L}_C . It is not my goal to present in great detail McCready's logic. So, let's look at just the ingredients needed to derive sentences containing slurs. **First of all, McCready introduces a new semantic type that is annotated with the superscript α^s , for "shunting type".** This semantic type is different from the CI type in the sense that, although it introduces a new dimension of meaning, it is resource sensitive (remember that CIs were not); that is, it does not duplicate the truth-conditional content in the output of a given rule. We can now modify (29) to refer to the new semantic type introduced:

- (40) **Parsetree interpretation:** Let \mathcal{T} be a semantic parsetree with the at-issue term $\alpha: \sigma^a$ on its root node, and distinct terms $\beta_1: \langle s^a, t^{\{c, s\}} \rangle, \dots, \beta_n: \langle s^a, t^{\{c, s\}} \rangle$, on nodes in it (extensionally, $\beta_1: t^{\{c, s\}}, \dots, \beta_n: t^{\{c, s\}}$). Then the interpretation of \mathcal{T} is the tuple $\langle \llbracket \alpha: \sigma^a \rrbracket^{M_i, g}, \{ \llbracket \beta_1: \langle s^a, t^{\{c, s\}} \rangle \rrbracket^{M_i, g}, \dots, \llbracket \beta_n: \langle s^a, t^{\{c, s\}} \rangle \rrbracket^{M_i, g} \} \rangle$ where $\llbracket . \rrbracket^{M_i, g}$ is the interpretation function, taking formulae of the meaning language to the interpreted structure M_i , relative to a variable assignment g .

Recall first Potts' axioms (using the more usual proof-tree notation):

(41) Potts' system again:




There are several axioms in McCready that make use of the new semantic type. For our purposes, Rule 7 will suffice:

$$(R7) \quad \frac{\alpha \diamond \beta: \sigma^a \times t^s}{\alpha: \sigma^a \bullet \beta: t^s}$$

“Roughly, we have a change in bookkeeping device corresponding to a change in typing: the diamond indicates that the two terms it conjoins are still ‘active’ in the derivation, but the bullet indicates that the CIE side has already gotten all its arguments and is ready for interpretation. [R7] thus, in a sense, moves shunting-typed terms out of active use. Doing so allows for interpretation via the rule in [11].” [McCready 2010: 20]

(42) Polidoro es sudaca.
Polidoro is South-American_{PEJORATIVE}



[From Saab & Carranza 2021: 505]

After the derivation is completed, parsetree interpretation, as stated in (39), gives us the correct result:

(43) <South-American(Polidoro), {Bad(^South-American)}>


We see that it is not complicated at all to extend Potts' logic to account for mixed expressions. McCready's strategy involves introducing types that introduce conventionally implied meanings but that, unlike Potts' CI types, exhaust the resource by not duplicating the at-issue content of the expression they take as argument. As Gutzmann (2015) demonstrates, there are other ways to obtain mixed content without the need to create new semantic types. In any case, McCready's system is a clear example of the potential of Potts' theory to account for expressive dimensions that were not contemplated in the original theory.

3. Some preliminary case studies and discussion

3.1. Puto/maldito/bendito in Spanish

The variants of *damn* in Spanish, such as *puto/maldito/bendito*, essentially behave like English *damn* in the relevant respects (see Saab and Carranza 2021). As we have already seen, expressives of the *damn* type take properties as arguments, and return a conventionally implicated proposition expressed through Potts' *BAD* function, which is vaguely translated as the function stating that "the speaker is in a heightened emotional state regarding X", where X is the plural individual composed of all members of the input set (see Potts 2005: 167-168). To see how expressives of the *damn* type work, consider the following syntax for a Spanish expressive DP like *los malditos neoliberales* 'the damn neoliberals':

(44)



Essentially,

(45) *maldito/puto/bendito*: $\langle \langle e^a, t^a \rangle, t^c \rangle$

So far, so good...

3.2. Honorifics and personal articles in Spanish and Catalan

Bernstein et al. (2019) show that personal articles denoting familiarity in some varieties of modern Catalan (e.g., *en Paco*, *na Carme*, see (46)) and the honorific *don/doña* denoting respect/formal distance in Spanish (e.g., *Doña Ana*, *Don Luis*, see (47)) have the same diachronic origin: the Latin noun *dominus*, which was used as an honorific title only reserved to the royalty (see (48)).

- (46) a. Balearic Catalan:
En Pere ha arribat tard.
 PA.MASC P. has arrived late
 'Pere has arrived late.'
 b. *Na* Maria ha arribat tard.
 PA.MASC M. has arrived late
 'María has arrived late.'

[Bernstein et al. (2019), p. 84, ex. (2)]

- (47) a. Spanish:
Don Luis llegó tarde.
 HON.MASC L. arrived late
 'Mr. Luis arrived late.'

- b. *Doña* *María* *llegó* *tarde*.
 HON.FEM *Maria* *arrived* *late*
 ‘Mrs. *María* *arrived* *late*.’
- (48) *dominus* > *ne* > *en-na* (Catalan)
dominus > *don-doña* (Spanish)

[Bernstein et al. (2019), p. 84, ex. (1)]

Morphosyntactic distribution of personal articles in Balearic Catalan:

Property#1: Number restriction

- (49) a. Personal article:
en (masc.sg), **ens* (masc.pl)
na (fem.sg), **nes* (fem.pl)
- b. Definite article:
el (masc.sg), *els* (masc.pl)
la (fem.sg), *les* (fem.pl)

[Bernstein et al. (2019), p. 90, ex. (6)]

Property #2: Adjacency to the proper name:

- (50) a. **en* *propi* *Pere*
 PA.MASC *same* *Pere*
- b. *el* *propi* *professor*
 the.MASC *same* *professor*
 ‘the same professor’

[Bernstein et al. (2019), p. 91, ex. (7)]

Property #3: Absence of restrictive modification

- (51) a. **en* *Pere* *que* *va* *arribar* *ahir*
 PA.MASC P. *that* *AUX* *arrive.INF* *yesterday*
- b. *el* *Pere* *que* *va* *arribar* *ahir*
 the.MASC P. *that* *AUX* *arrive.INF* *yesterday*
 ‘the *Pere* *that* *arrived* *yesterday*’

[Bernstein et al. (2019), p. 91, ex. (8)-(9)]

A very similar distribution is found with the honorific *don/doña* in Spanish when it modifies proper names:²

Property#1: Number restriction

- (52) *don* (masc.sg), **dones* (masc.pl)
doña (fem.sg), **doñas* (fem.pl)

Property #2: Adjacency to the proper name:

- (53) **don* *mismo* *Luis*
 HON.MASC *same* *Luis*


Property #3: Absence of restrictive modification

- (54) a. **don* *Luis* *que* *llegó* *ayer*
 HON.MASC L. *that* *arrived* *yesterday*
- b. *el* *Luis* *que* *llegó* *ayer*
 the L. *that* *arrived* *yesterday*
 ‘the *Luis* *who* *arrived* *yesterday*’

[adapted from Bernstein et al. (2019), p. 91, ex. (12)-(14)]

² At least in my dialect, there is also a different use of *don/doña* in which the honorific modifies an empty noun, i.e., there is also a pronominal use of *don/doña*. In those cases, pluralization is not impossible (e.g., *Escúchenme, doñas* ‘Listen, HON.FEM.PL’).

(60)




(61) Lexical entry for *en/na*: $[[en/na]] = \lambda x. \text{Familiar}(I^c, x): \langle e^a, t^c \rangle$
 [I^c = interlocutors of the context]

Familiarity effect:

- (62) a. Chomsky ha publicat un altre llibre.
 Chomsky has published an other book
- b. *En* Chomsky ha publicat un altre llibre.
 ART.MASC Chomsky has published an other book
 ‘Chomsky has published another book.’

[Bernstein et al. (2019), p. 102, ex. (36)]

(63)



Hyper-projectability and speaker-oriented effects:

Spanish:

- (64) a. Ana cree que *don* Luis no viene a
 A. believes that HON.MASC L. not comes to
 la fiesta.
 the party
 ‘Ana believes that Mr. Luis does not come to the party.’
- b. Ana no vio a *don* Luis.
 A. not saw DOM HON.MASC L.
 ‘Ana did not see Mr. Luis.’
- c. ¿Vio Ana a *don* Luis?
 saw A. DOM HON.MASC L.
 ‘Did Ana see Mr. Luis?’
- d. Si *don* Luis está solo, sería bueno visitarlo.
 if HON.MASC L. is alone, would.be good visit.INF=HIM
 ‘If Mr. Luis is alone, it would be good to visit him.’

Balearic Catalan:

- (65) a. N’Anna creu que *na* Carme ha arribat tard.
 PA.FEM-A. believes that PA.FEM C. has arrived late
 ‘Anna believes that Carme has arrived late.’
- b. N’Anna no va veure *en* Lluís.
 PA.FEM-A. not AUX see.INF ART.MASC L.
 ‘Anna did not see Lluís.’
- c. Va veure *en* Lluís, n’Anna?
 AUX. see.INF PA.MASC L. PA.FEM-A.
 ‘Did Anna see Lluís?’
- d. Si *en* Lluís està sol, seria bo visitar-lo.
 if PA.MASC L. is alone would.be good visit.INF-HIM
 ‘If Lluís is alone, it would be good to visit him.’

This approach directly explains why, then, honorifics and personal articles are fully incompatible with *true* predicates denoting in $\langle e, t \rangle^a$ (or $\langle s, \langle e, t \rangle^a \rangle$).

- (66) a. * Llegó el *don* médico.
 arrived the HON.MASC doctor
 ‘The doctor arrived.’
- b. Va arribar *el/*en* professor.
 AUX. arrive.INF. the.MASC/PA.MASC professor
 ‘The professor arrived.’

The impossibility of combining Spanish honorifics and Catalan personal articles with true predicates boils down to a straightforward type mismatch, in which the predicate denoting in $\langle e, t \rangle^a$ cannot satisfy the e^a type argument that the expressive functor requires. As we saw, other expressives like *maldito* ‘damn’ behaves differently:

- (67) El *maldito* profesor me desaprobó de nuevo.
 the damn professor CL.1SG.ACC failed again
 ‘That damn professor failed me again.’

So, the difference that explains why the relevant sentences in (66) are ungrammatical but the one in (67) is perfect must be found in the semantic type of the argument that *maldito* and *don* require and nothing else:

- (68) a. *maldito/puto/bendito*: $\langle\langle e^a, t^a \rangle, t^c \rangle$
 b. *don/doña*: $\langle e^a, t^c \rangle$ (the same with personal articles)

So far, so good...

3.3. Interactions

Consider now this nice contrast:

- (69) a. Los Alfredo(s) que conozco llegaron tarde.
 the Alfred.(PL) that know.1SG arrived late
 ‘The Alfreds I know arrived late.’
 b. *Los dones Alfredo(s) que conozco llegaron tarde.
 the HON.MASCPL Alfred.(PL) that know.1SG arrived late

The reason of the badness of (69b) is simple: merging Num⁰ right above *nP* converts this *nP* into a property of the $\langle e, t \rangle^a$ type (i.e., a semantic predicate of some sort). The resulting semantic object is not a suitable semantic argument for the *don/doña* expressive functor, which requires a semantic object of the e^a type, not of the $\langle e, t \rangle^a$ type.

Next, consider this possible counterexample:

- (70) Vimos a la *maldita* *doña* Ana
 saw DOM the damn HON.FEM A.
 ‘We saw the *damn Mrs. Ana.*’

Note: the expressive *maldito* cannot take referential proper names as arguments. And this is borne out:

- (71) *[*(Maldita)* Ana (*maldita*) llegó.
 damn A. damn arrived

Therefore, for a proper name root to be combined with this type of expressives, the proper name has first to be converted into a predicate by the presence of a *nP*-selecting Num head, which is exactly what happens with the example in (70). But if this is the case, then the string *doña Ana* has to be reanalyzed as a unit interpreted as a metalinguistic predicate, roughly of the form *person referred to as “doña Ana”*.

Here is another piece of evidence.

- (72) Los “don Alfredo” que conozco llegaron tarde.
 The.PL HON.PL Alfred that know.1SG arrived late
 ‘The “Mr. Alfred” I know arrived late.’

3.4. The problem of argument extension

Consider again (67):

- (73) El *maldito* profesor me desaprobó de nuevo.
 the damn professor CL.1SG.ACC failed again
 ‘That damn professor failed me again.’

As is clear, the expressive does not affect the set of professors but a particular individual or the event of being failed by a certain professor. In Potts' words:

“Another issue that I have not addressed thus far is the fact that EAs [Expressive Adjectives, AS] need not be interpreted as taking their common noun sisters as arguments. The immediately containing full noun phrase or the entire clause can also be targets:

- [74] a. We have to look after Sheila's damn dog.
b. Nowhere did the instructions say that the damn machine didn't come with an electric plug!

With [74a], the speaker probably does not express disapprobation of all dogs, but rather just Sheila's; [74b] arguably expresses the speaker's frustration with the fact that the machine in question arrived plugless. Since the syntactic evidence militates against movement of attributive adjectives, but the existence of these readings indicates that some can act as clause-level functors, it seems safe to conclude that this does not happen via syntactic processes.”

[Potts 2005: 166, my emphasis]

But the problem does not only reduce to the presence of this mismatch, but also to the absence of it in the case of epithets like that *bastard Kresge*:

“It is very interesting that expressive adjectives show this split between where they are realized and where they are interpreted. This is especially surprising given the fact that expressive epithets like *bastard* in *that bastard Kresge* have semantically been analyzed in the same way as expressive adjectives. Why should this be? What is special about adjectives and their place inside the DP that they behave in this way, whereas nominal elements do not seem to behave in a similar way.”

[Gutzmann 2019: 264-265]

Exactly the same argument can be made on the basis of what we have just claimed about personal articles and honorifics in Catalan and Spanish. In effect, for a case like (75) is simply absurd to interpret honorification toward Luis.

- (75) *Doña* María habló con Luis.
 HON.FEM Maria talked with Luis
 ‘Mrs. María talked to Luis.’

Yet, the distinction does not seem to be categorial. The noun *señor/señora* ‘mister/miss’ in Spanish, which is also honorific, also have argument extension effects, although in a more restricted way:

- (76) La señora abogada llegó temprano.
 the.F.sg HON lawyer arrived early
 ‘The honorific lawyer arrived early.’

Like in the case of (74a) here honorification is with respect to the individual denoted by the entire DP. Indeed, the speaker can show respect for this particular lawyer without showing respect for any other lawyer in the entire world. **Let me then conclude with the observation that only a subset of expressives shows argument extension effects.**

Main conjecture: presence/absence of argument extension requires a distinction both in the way of combination between expressives and their arguments and in the locus of expressivity in general. I contend that **expressivity is an all-the-way phenomenon**, which can take place at different grammatical interfaces. This makes sense if we take seriously the intuition behind the very notion of use-condition, as opposed to truth-condition. Put differently, any object made available by the computational system may have (or must have, indeed) use-conditions, i.e., a set of associated conventions which regiment conditions on appropriate use. Still in a very conjectural sense, this applies to the distinction between expressives that have or does not have argument extension effects in the following way: for those cases in which syntactic and semantic combination is strictly respected (e.g., the honorific *don*), we conjecture that use-conditions are entirely determined in the syntax-LF, whereas for those cases in which argument extension show up, use-conditions are entirely determined at PF. It could be also the case that depending on the locus of a given expressive its content has to be modeled also in a different way, perhaps along the lines proposed in Rett (2021a,b).

Question: How exactly are expressive meanings determined at the PF interface?

I will postpone discussion of argument extension to Lecture #3 and I will start exploring the conjecture in the other topic of this lecture, namely: **mixed expressives**. At any rate, there are, of course, many questions opened by this general approach. A pressing one is how the conceptual-intentional cognitive system accesses the information provided by the computational system of the language faculty (Chomsky 1995, 2000 and 2001), in particular the context systems:

“The hardest to define given our present state of knowledge are **the context systems** that narrow the information transmitted through the derivation (coded in the relevant representation), and select the information that is useful for the context of use.”

[Reinhart 2006, 4]

To be competent with a slur, for example, requires knowing the conditions that make it correct in a certain context of use. This supposes manipulation of information other than purely inferential or conceptual. Both are required, yet. A pair of terms opposed in register is constituted as such because the concepts expressed by each member are identical. Yet, they are used in different contexts for different purposes, and this is something that requires linking lexical and inferential content to particular contexts of use. It is in this sense that I assume here that the context system must have access both to the PF and LF interfaces (see also Corver 2016, for a similar argument).

4. The architecture of grammar and the locus of mixed expressives

There are some intriguing properties that make some sort of expressives (register, slurs, etc.) a fascinating area of interdisciplinary study (linguistics, philosophy of language, ethics, etc.). Here are two crucial ones:

- (77) (A) In the general case, expressives form doublets: *boliviano/bolita* ‘Bolivian/Bolivian (pejorative)’, *comer/morfar*, ‘to eat’
(B) These doublets contribute to a certain meaning dimension: style, color or expressivity.

As far as I can tell, these two properties together are not straightforwardly captured in models like McCready’s (see section 2). My aim in this section is sketching a partial theory of mixed expressivity that accounts for these properties. Just to give you a flavor of the idea I have in mind, let me repeat the functionalist dogma (see section 1):

Trubetzkoy (1939): Although free phonological variation does not contribute to representation, this does not imply absence of any meaning contribution. In the usual case, *free variation makes a stylistic contribution*. E.g., in the domain of palatals in Rioplatense, free variation characterizes the social type of the speaker

Then, free variation implies:

(A) competition in the paradigmatic (and phonetic) space


and, at least in some cases,

(B) a non-truth conditional contribution to meaning.

General conjecture: At least some forms of expressivity are the direct result of lexical free variation. The final picture results in a theory that integrates Fregean color into semantics.

Implementation: Certain non-truth conditional meanings are triggered *by properties of vocabulary items* (in the sense of Halle & Marantz 1993 and subsequent work). In other words, those meanings arise “late” and are not part of the syntactic-semantic derivation. Thus, we derive the notion of parallel meaning dimension from architectural considerations without the need for any metalogical operator especially designated to separate meaning dimensions (*pace* Potts 2005 and McCready 2010, among others).

(78)



Empirical argument: Expressivity must be expressed (uttered). The behavior of expressives in the realm of ellipsis supports this claim.


Domain:

A. Register (*comer* ‘to eat’ vs. *morfar* ‘to eat_{inf}’)

B. Slurs (*boliviano* vs. *bolita*)

4.1. Expressivity as a PF property

(79) Harley (2014: 228)



List 1: *Feature bundles:* Syntactic primitives, both interpretable and uninterpretable, functional and contentful.

List 2: *Vocabulary Items:* Instructions for pronouncing terminal nodes in context.

List 3: *Encyclopedia:* Instructions for interpreting terminal nodes in context.

Example for functional morphemes:

List 1: [imperfect past]

List 2: [imperfect past] ↔ /-ía/ / TV_{2,3} ___

[imperfect past] ↔ /-ba/

List 3: [imperfect past] ↔ [[truth-conditional meaning]]

Trabajar ‘to work’ vs. laburar ‘to work_{inf}’

List 1: [abstract Root for *trabajar*]

List 2: [**trabajar**] ↔ /**trabajár**/

List 3: [to work] ↔ [[λx.x works]]


List 1: [abstract Root for *laburar*]

List 2: [**laburar**] ↔ /**laburár**/BIAS/CI

BIAS: $c \in CU(\text{laburar})$ only if, in c , c_a is a participant in register *informal*

List 3: [to work informal] ↔ [[λx.x works]]

(80)



On this theory, the metalogic symbol • (Potts 2005) is trivial: it is deduced from architectural considerations.

A crucial question is, of course, how lexical competition in the paradigmatic space is determined. I conjecture that the following general principle of lexical competition is active in natural languages:

(81) **Principle of expressive meaning (PEM):** Given a pair of abstract nodes X and Y, taken from List 1, if X and Y are not semantically distinguishable at LF (list 3), they must be *semantically* distinguished at PF (List 2).

“Meaning” in expressive semantics: If Y is semantically distinguished from X at LF, we say that the meaning contribution of both lexical items is truth-conditionally relevant. If Y is semantically distinguished from X at PF we say that the meaning contribution of both lexical items is stylistic or expressive, i.e., non-truth conditionally relevant. In any case, the distinction is semantic in the favored sense of expressive semantics. PEM is observed for the pairs of Roots *laburar* and *trabajar*. And in this case in particular, we are led to conclude that the difference is purely expressive. Crucially, **PEM is NOT a principle of synonymy blocking: *trabajar* and *laburar* are still synonymous (truth-conditionally equivalent).**

4.2. The argument from ellipsis

4.2.1. Expressive mismatches under ellipsis

*Vehicle Change Generalization (Barros & Saab 2016):*³

(82) Recoverability conditions in ellipsis make reference to content not character.

Classic Vehicle Change (Fiengo & May 1994):

(83) a. They arrested **the man**₃, but **he**₃ doesn't know why.
 b. They arrested **the man**₁, but **he**₁ doesn't know why <they arrested ***the man**₁/**him**₁>.

³ As is standard since Kaplan (1989), I take the character of any expression E as a function from context to content and the content itself as function from circumstances of evaluation to truth values (i.e., to <s,t> objects under some accounts). Standardly, a Kaplanian context is a tuple consisting at least of the following parameters: <w, t, a, h, l>, where w is a possible world, t is a time, a is the agent of the utterance, h the hearer, and l the location.

Indexical mismatches (Thoms 2013, 2015):

- (84) A: Can you help **me**? [requesting help]
B: Yes, I can <help **you**>.

Here you have Merchant's (1999) solution:

Focus condition:

- (85) A constituent α can be deleted only if α is e-GIVEN.
- (86) An expression E counts as e-GIVEN iff E has a salient antecedent A and, modulo \exists -type shifting,
i. A entails the Focus closure of E (written F-clo(E)), and
ii. E entails F-clo(A)
- (87) F-clo(α), is the result of replacing F-marked parts of α with \exists -bound variables.
- (88) a. [_F Ann] loves Peter and [_F Mary] does <love Peter> too.
b. F-clo($\llbracket A \rrbracket$) = $\llbracket \exists x. x \text{ loves Peter} \rrbracket$
F-clo($\llbracket E \rrbracket$) = $\llbracket \exists y. y \text{ loves Peter} \rrbracket$
Therefore, $\llbracket A \rrbracket$ entails F-clo($\llbracket E \rrbracket$) and $\llbracket E \rrbracket$ entails F-clo($\llbracket A \rrbracket$).

The crucial point is that descriptive properties of indexicals or R-expressions do not alter the mutual entailment relation under some variable assignment. **If this is on the right track, then other mismatches should be allowed beyond indexicals and proper names. Consider, for instance, pairs of words opposed only by the bias they express. In Argentinian Spanish, for instance, the “neutral” verb *comer* ‘to eat’ is semantically undistinguishable from the verb *morfar* ‘to eat’. This can be demonstrated by well-known substitution tests: any occurrence of the verb *comer* can be replaced (modulo metalinguistic and sociolinguistic tones) by an occurrence of the verb *morfar* and vice versa.** The predictions for mutual entailment in ellipsis are more or less clear. In principle, register mismatches between A and E should be allowed, in a way such that modeling the following E-sites as indicated should be possible in fragments like the following ones:

- (89) A: Qué **comiste**?
what ate.2SG.NEUTRAL
'What did you eat?'
B: Una pizza <**morfé**>.
a pizza ate. 1SG.INFORMAL
'a pizza.'
- (90) A: Qué **morfaste**?
what ate.2SG.INFORMAL
B: Una pizza <**comí**>.
a pizza ate.1SG.NEUTRAL

Of course, without any discursive clue it would be just impossible to know whether such E-sites are possible or not. Consider in this respect the following discourse:⁴

- (91) A: Qué **morfaste**?
what ate.2SG.INFORMAL
B: Una pizza <?>, pero no tolero cuando

⁴ This present test is modeled after Lipták (2020), who discusses a different type of putative mismatch in ellipsis. Here is one of her examples:

- (i) A: What are you devouring?
B: A pizza, but I am not devouring it.
B: # I am devouring a pizza, but I am not devouring it!

a pizza but not tolerate.1SG when
 hablás tan informalmente. Yo nunca lo hago.
 speak.2SG so informally I never it do
 ‘A pizza. But I don’t tolerate when you speak informally. I never do it’

At first sight, the metalinguistic comment introduced by B allows us to reject an E-site modeled as containing the informal counterpart of the verb *to eat*. Notice that a non-elliptical version of (92) is infelicitous here:⁵

- (92) A: Qué **morfaste**?
 what ate.2SG.INFORMAL
 B: #Una pizza **morfé**, pero no tolero cuando
 a pizza ate.2SG.INFOR but not tolerate.1SG when
 hablás tan informalmente. Yo nunca lo hago.
 speak.2SG so informally I never it do
 ‘#I ate(informal) a pizza. But I don’t tolerate when you speak informally. I never do it’

The mutual entailment approach apparently provides the right answer to the problem, as the neutral form *comer* could take the informal form *morfar* as antecedent and outputs a legitimate E-site.

- (93) A: Qué [_{TP} **morfaste** *t*]?
 what ate.2SG.INFORMAL
 B: Una pizza <[_{TP} **comí** *t*]>, pero no tolero
 a pizza ate.1SG.NEU but not tolerate.1SG
 cuando hablás tan informalmente.
 when speak.2SG so informally

I call this phenomenon **Bias Vehicle Change**, cases where the change is produced in the particular bias of some lexical expression. For (91), and assuming that short answers are derived as cases of TP ellipsis (Merchant 2004), mutual entailment between A and E should be permitted under Focus Closure:

- (94) a. F-clo([A]) = [A] = $\exists x[g(1) \text{ morfar } x]$ entails $[[TP_E]] = \exists y[g(1) \text{ comer } y]$
 b. F-clo([E]) = [E] = $\exists y[g(1) \text{ comer } y]$ entails $[[TP_A]] = \exists x[g(1) \text{ morfar } x]$
 c. [A] entails F-clo([E]) and [E] entails F-clo([A]).

Generalization 1 (G1):

- (95) Bias Vehicle Change is licensed under TP-ellipsis.

	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Informal</i>	
(96)	tomar	chupar	‘to drink’
	sudar/transpirar	chivar	‘to sweat’
	eyacular	acabar	‘to ejaculate/to come’
	pagar	garpar	‘to pay’
	trabajar	laburar	‘to work’
	escapar	rajar	‘to escape’
	defecar	cagar	‘to defecate/to shit’
	delatar	buchonear	‘to betray’
	molestar	joder	‘to bother’

⁵ Of course, (92B) improves (or it is just good) if speaker B adds air quotations or other metalinguistic gesture/devices.

However, G1 does not seem to be true of every type of ellipsis. Consider in this respect Spanish NP-ellipsis.

- (97) a. El *culo* de Juan es más grande
 the.MASC.SG ass.MASC.SG of J. is more big
 que el <*culo*> de María.
 that the.MASC.SG ass.MASC.SG of M.
- b. La *cola* de Juan es más grande
 the.FEM.SG tail.FEM.SG of J. is more big
 que la <*cola*> de María.
 that the.FEM.SG tail.FEM.SG of M.
- c. *El *culo* de Juan es más grande
 the.MASC.SG ass.MASC.SG of J. is more big
 que la <*cola*> de María.
 that the.FEM.SG <tail.FEM.SG > of M.
- d. *La *cola* de Juan es más grande
 the.FEM.SG tail.FEM.SG of J. is more big
 que el <*culo*> de María.
 that the.MASC.SG <ass.MASC.SG > of M.

Generalization 2 (G2):


- (98) Bias Vehicle Change is not licensed under NP-ellipsis.

Problem: Either we have a dissociated identity condition or one of the two generalizations is spurious.

4.2.2. A syntactic solution


Generalization 1 is spurious. Ellipsis does not allow for the type of mismatches that mutual entailment predicts. A uniform syntactic identity condition applying in narrow syntax (Saab 2008) plus the theory of expressivity I'm defending are enough to make the right predictions:

- (99)



- (100) A: Qué [TP **morfaste** t]?
 B: *Una pizza <[TP **comí** t]>, pero no tolero cuando hablás tan informalmente.
- (101) A: Qué [TP **morfaste** t]?
 B: Una pizza <[TP **morfé** t]>, pero no tolero cuando hablás tan informalmente.

(102)




Given that register is a property of vocabulary items (List 2 items), it follows now why you can model the E-site as in (101B) (i.e., respecting lexical identity) and have a coherent discourse at the same time.

4.2.3. More evidence: *vesre* talk

	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Informal</i>	
(103)	pagar	garpar	‘to pay’
	defecar	cagar/ garcar	‘to defecate’
	pasarse	sarparse	‘to cross the limits’

- (104) A: Qué [TP **garpaste** t]? (*garpar* = √75 in the syntax)
 what paid._{INFORMAL}
- B: Una pizza <[TP √75 t]>, pero no tolero cuando hablás
 a pizza but not tolerate. 1SG speak.2SG
 tan informalmente...
 so informally

(105)



4.3. Slurs: first approximation

As discussed in section 2.4, paradigmatic slurs are expressions *prima facie* associated with the expression of a contemptuous attitude concerning a group of people identified in terms of their origin or descent (“spic”), race (“nigger”), sexual orientation (“faggot”), ethnicity or religion (“kike”), gender (“whore”), etc. They meet the two criteria I initially proposed to determine the type of expressivity I am concerned with:

- (106) (A) In the general case, expressives form doublets: *boliviano/bolita* ‘Bolivian/Bolivian (pejorative)’, *comer/morfar*, ‘to eat’
 (B) These doublets contribute to a certain meaning dimension: style, color or expressivity.

That the first criterion is satisfied is shared by most extant accounts of slurs. This comes in the form of the so-called *Identity Thesis*, the idea that the representational dimension of a slur is equivalent to the representational dimension of its neutral counterpart.⁶ Thus, according to this conception, the two sentences in (41) are extensionally equivalent:

- (107) a. Juan es sudaca.
 J. is South-American_{PEJORATIVE}
 ‘Juan is South-American (pejorative).’
 b. Juan es sudamericano.
 J. is South-American
 ‘Juan is South-American.’

The ellipsis test:

- (108) A: ¿A cuántos sudacas viste en la fiesta?
 to how-many South-Americans_{PEJ} saw.2SG in the party
 ‘How many South-American_{PEJ} did you see at the party?’
 B: Vi a tres <sudacas>, pero podrías evitar
 saw.1SG to three South-American_{PEJ} but could.2SG avoid
 ese modo de hablar de los sudamericanos.
 that way of speaking of the South-American_{PEJ}
 Yo nunca hablo así de ellos.
 I never speak so of them

‘Three, but you could avoid talking that way about South-Americans. I never talk that way.’

This is an interesting state of affairs. On the one hand, it shows that ellipsis is an apt strategy to nullify the bias encoded in some lexical items. This follows from the present account that requires lexical insertion in order to make the expressivity salient in the discourse. Alternative accounts that encode the bias in the syntax don’t offer a good explanation for why B’s answer in (108B) is a non-biased answer. Recall that McCready (2010) proposes lexical entries like the (109a) (compare with my proposal in (109b)) where a conventional implicature is directly encoded in full lexical items that are manipulated by the syntax and LF:

- (109) a. $\llbracket \text{sudaca} \rrbracket = \lambda x. \text{South-American}(x) \blacklozenge \text{Bad}(\cap \text{South-American}): \langle e, t \rangle^a \times t^s$
 b. $\llbracket \text{sudaca} \rrbracket = \lambda x. \text{South-American}(x)$ [List 1 item]

⁶ For the argument to hold in the case of slurs, one needs to commit oneself to the so-called ‘Identity Thesis’ (which I will take for granted in this talk): the idea is that (i) the two meaning dimensions of a slur-word are independent from each other, and (ii) its representational dimension is equivalent to the representational dimension of its neutral counterpart. This is the core thesis of Neutral Counterpart Theories, supported by Anderson & Lepore (2013a,b), Jeshion (2013a,b), Predelli (2013), Whiting (2013), and McCready (2010), among others. For objections to that thesis, see Ashwell (2016), Losada (2021), and Hom (2008, 2010), among others. See also Díaz Legaspe (2018) for insightful considerations in favor of restricting the thesis in the case of some kind of slurs, the so-called ‘normalizing’ ones. For a general defense of the Identity Thesis, see Caso & Lo Guercio (2016).

Without further ado, ellipsis should not block the conventional implicature that B has a negative attitude towards South-Americans. In sum, slurs behave under ellipsis as predicted by the hypothesis of “late” expressivity.

The moral to be extracted from this particular behavior of informal terms and slurs is that expressivity must be expressed (uttered). Putting the type of non-truth conditional meanings that these terms have in the syntactic-semantic derivation leaves this basic observation unexplained.

A final question is how the expressive meaning of a given slur can be modeled in the present framework. An important similarity with informal terms is that, in the general case, slurs are also informal. This means that we want to model part of their stylistic meaning as we did for informal terms in section 2.2 (see Díaz Legaspe *et al* 2020 on the relation between register and slurs):

(110) *Bias for sudaca*: $c \in CU(\textit{sudaca})$ only if, in c , c_a is a participant in register *informal*

Of course, this is not enough. A concrete use of a slur involves much more than just informal register. Adapting ideas from Orlando and Saab (2020a,b), I would like to suggest that slurs characterize contexts by making salient a certain stereotype of the target group. Concretely, I conjecture that stereotypes can be conceived of as semantic objects ranging over sets of propositions which, taken together, constitute a certain misinformed theory of a given human group. In model-theoretic terms, stereotypes are similar to Kratzerian Modal Bases, *i.e.*, functions of the $\langle\langle s, t \rangle, t \rangle$ type that take propositions as inputs and return sets of propositions of a certain form:

(111) $[[\textit{Stereotype}]^{s,w} = \lambda p. \exists P_{\langle e, t \rangle} [P \in C \ \& \ p = [\lambda w. P(\textit{Group})(w)]]]$

With this in mind, we can proceed to define the bias dimension of ‘*sudaca*’ as follows:

(112) *Bias for ‘sudaca’*: $c \in CU(\textit{sudaca})$ only if, in c , c_a is a participant in register *informal* and a stereotype about South-Americans is in force in c

4.4. Summary

I have sketched a general project for what I have called *expressive semantics*. The main goal of this research agenda is deriving Potts’ metalinguistic operator for separating meaning dimensions from architectural considerations. I have proposed that this can be done to the extent the PF interface is capable of introducing stylistic meanings in the favored sense. I have conjectured that PEM, repeated below, is responsible for generating PF meanings on the basis of semantic vacuity at LF.

(113) **Principle of expressive meaning (PEM)**: Given a pair of abstract nodes X and Y, taken from List 1, if X and Y are not semantically distinguishable at LF (list 3), they must be *semantically distinguished* at PF (List 2).

The proposal captures the basic properties of certain type of expressive terms, repeated below, and receives robust evidence from ellipsis and *vesre* talk:

(114) (A) In the general case, expressives form doublets: *boliviano/bolita* ‘Bolivian/Bolivian (pejorative)’, *comer/morfar*, ‘to eat’
 (B) These doublets contribute to a certain meaning dimension: style, color or expressivity.

The hope is that a proper and more explicit formulation of the conjectures I have discussed here will be extended to other empirical domains in the realm of expressive semantics (see Lecture #3).

5. Conclusions and plans for (the day after) tomorrow

5.1. Results

Today, we revised formal approaches to the meaning of expressive adjectives (115a) and of mixed terms, namely, slurs and other informal terms (115b):

- (115) a. No encuentro las putas llaves.
not find.1sg the.f.pl expressive keys
'I don't find the fucking keys.'
- b. Ana es una puta.
Ana is a prostitute._{PEJORATIVE}
'Ana is a b...'

Two important consequences of the discussion today:

- A. Given their behavior with respect argument extension effects, expressives cannot receive a uniform treatment. I conjectured that those expressives that show up argument extension effects cannot be derived syntactically. A concrete implementation of the idea will be given in lecture #3.
- B. Given their behavior under ellipsis, I conjectured that the expressive meaning of mixed terms arises at PF through a principle of lexical competition. I have implemented the idea framed with the tools of distributed morphology.

5.2. More than words

Recall:

- (116) **The obvious:** All human languages have expressive words.

Here is a less obvious observation:

- (117) **Less obvious:** (Maybe all) human languages have an expressive grammar.

Where does this grammar come from? Two conjectures:

- (118) **The expressive-first conjecture (EF-conjecture):** language evolved first as a device for the expression of feelings, attitudes, and so on.

"[...] we may further distinguish what may be labelled the ape-stage where the sounds are only used and apprehended as indicating emotion or feelings, and the human stage where they are also used and understood as descriptions of objects or facts."

[Jørgensen 1937: 294]

(119) **The representation-first conjecture (RF-conjecture):** language is mainly a representational system.

“I believe that, in order to understand the emotive dimension in a linguistic perspective, one has to base oneself on language conceived as an instrument for reasoning. On this basis, affective meaning would appear to be a complication of rational language”

[Pos 1934: 138]

Corver (2016) is a lucid, contemporary implementation of the RF-conjecture. Concretely, he assumes, in a way similar to what I did here, that emotion is read by the appraisal systems through information available or deduced from the PF interface (crucially, not from LF). Yet, for Corver the grammar of emotion/expressivity requires deviation of rule of grammar, in at least three different ways:

1. **Space-based indexation:** a symbol (e.g., a functional category) indexes high amount of information and high distinguishability if it is in a deviant (marked) position in a linguistic representation.

2. **Symbol-based indexation:** a symbol indexes high amount of information and high distinguishability if its form deviates from the expected form (e.g., an augmented form, an unexpected case or gender form).

3. **Indexation by duplication:** a symbol (e.g., a suffix or a phonological feature) ‘spreads out’ across a linguistic expression and this way indexes high amount of information and high distinguishability.
[Corver 2016: 244-245]

(120) a. Jan las (me) **een** boeken!
Jan read (me) a books
‘How many books Jan read!’

[space-based indexation]

b. **Dat** denkt dat hij heel wat is!
that_{NEUT} thinks that he quite something is
‘That guy thinks he is an important person.’

[symbol-based indexation]

c. Jan kocht een hele erge dure auto.
Jan bought a real-*e* very-*e* expensive-*e* car
‘Jan bought a really expensive car.’

[indexation by duplication]

[Corver 2016: 245]

Arguably, pejoratives can be conceived of as a case of

(121) a. Juan es sudaca.
J. is South-American_{PEJORATIVE}
‘Juan is South-American (pejorative).’

b. Juan es sudamericano.
J. is South-American
‘Juan is South-American.’

Now, could be *argument extension* be conceived as an especial instance of space-based indexation? Why not? (Take it as another homework!)

- (122) a. We have to look after Sheila's damn dog.
b. Nowhere did the instructions say that the damn machine didn't come with an electric plug!

If this is, indeed, a case of space-based indexation, then, Corver's approach could be seen as a particular way of implementing the main conjecture introduced at the end of section 3.

Main conjecture: presence/absence of argument extension requires a distinction both in the way of combination between expressives and their arguments and in the locus of expressivity in general. I contend that expressivity is an all-the-way phenomenon, which can take place at different grammatical interfaces. This makes sense if we take seriously the intuition behind the very notion of use-condition, as opposed to truth-condition. Put differently, any object made available by the computational system may have (or must have, indeed) use-conditions, i.e., a set of associated conventions which regiment conditions of appropriate use. Still in a very conjectural sense, this applies to the distinction between expressives that have or does not have argument extension effects in the following way: for those cases in which syntactic and semantic combination is strictly respected (e.g., the honorific *don*), we conjecture that use-conditions are entirely determined in the syntax-LF, whereas for those cases in which argument extension show up, use conditions are entirely determined at PF.

In the coming lectures, I will assume a (perhaps weak) version of the RF-conjecture, but *pace* Corver, I contend that linguistic imperfection is not (at least always) needed for the building of linguistic emotion. Concretely,

Tomorrow, I will discuss a putative case of space-based indexation (binominals in Spanish and Romance) and show that there are ways of analyzing it just as another instance of "perfect" syntax, although with some degree of non-deviant manipulations. I will call this kind of syntactic manipulation *syntactic recycling*.

Thursday, I will further discuss putative instances both of space-based indexation (expressives and argument extension, again) and putative cases of indexation by duplication (clitic doubling in Rioplatense Spanish). For the first case, I will show that, again, regular grammar can give rise to argument extension effects, under the assumption that ornamental morphology is, of course, regular grammar. As for the second case, we will see that clitic doubling partially contradicts Corver's expectations and that the phenomenon can be seen as another instance of *syntactic recycling*. Yet, a final case in favor of Corver's syntactic deviation thesis would be also briefly discussed, namely, the so-called use of *inclusive language* in Spanish, which arguably requires syntactic deviation in Corver's sense.

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