

(2019) we assume that proximal demonstratives are associated with a feature SPEAKER (Terenghi's [+AUTHOR]) while distal demonstratives are associated with a feature OTHER (Terenghi's [-AUTHOR]). This is schematized in (4):

- (4) a. [DP DEM_{SPEAKER} D [NP]] → proximal spatial demonstrative
 b. [DP DEM_{OTHER} D [NP]] → distal spatial demonstrative

As for the non-spatial interpretation of demonstratives we propose that it derives by 'recycling' the spatial demonstrative in a structural position above the DP, dedicated to regulating conversational interaction, namely Ritter & Wiltschko's (2019) nominal interactional structure. This layer of structure is the nominal equivalent of Wiltschko's (2021) interactional structure and consists of a speaker and an addressee-oriented grounding layer. The speaker-oriented grounding layer introduces the speaker's ground (i.e., what the speaker knows at the current state of the interaction, including propositions and DR's) while the addressee-oriented grounding layer introduces the addressee's ground. We propose that proximal demonstratives are 'recycled' in SpecGround_{Spkr}P, as in (5a) while distal demonstratives are recycled in SpecGround_{Adr}P, as in (5b).

- (5) a. [GroundAdrP [GroundSpkrP DEM_{SPKR} [DP ~~DEM_{SPKR}~~]]] → novel DR
 b. [GroundAdrP DEM_{OTHER} [GroundSpkrP [DP ~~DEM_{OTHER}~~]]] → familiar DR

We assume that 'recycling' is a form of movement where the moved element is (re)interpreted in the derived position: the DR is interpreted as being located in the speaker's ground or in the addressee's ground. The target of recycling is restricted by the feature associated with the demonstrative such that the feature [SPEAKER] on DEM can only be (re-)interpreted in Ground_{SPKR} and not in Ground_{ADR} while the feature [OTHER] on DEM can only be (re-)interpreted in Ground_{ADR} and not in Ground_{SPKR}.

A potential alternative. We further compare our syntactic analysis with a hypothetical alternative according to which the features [SPEAKER] and [OTHER] are simply reinterpreted as referring to the common ground rather than the utterance location. This could be viewed as a kind of metaphorical extension of the deictic interpretation. We argue, however, that our syntactically conditioned analysis is empirically and theoretically superior. We present two empirical arguments. First, we show that in languages where demonstratives are composed via a determiner and a dedicated locative particle, recycling is not available (i.e., the locative particles cannot be used to refer to novel vs. familiar DRs), as in (6) from non-standard German.

- (6) Ich kenne den Schauspieler **da/dort**.
 I know the actor here/there
 'I know this/that actor.' (spatial deictic interpretation only)

If the reuse of demonstratives were simply a matter of metaphoric extension this would be unexpected. On our analysis it follows assuming that locative particles cannot be reinterpreted in the interactional structure.

A second empirical argument concerns the fact that spatial demonstratives can be re-interpreted affectively (Lakoff 1974) such that proximal demonstratives can be interpreted as emotionally close (i.e., positive) while distal demonstratives can be interpreted as emotionally distant (i.e., negative). However, we show that cross-linguistically this pattern is not systematic (categorical), unlike what we see for the SGC, which is categorical. We argue that this difference follows straightforwardly from the fact that there is a syntactic grounding layer which is responsible for the reinterpretation of spatial demonstratives as grounding demonstratives whereas universally, there is no corresponding syntactic emotive layer that would be responsible for a hypothetical 'spatial-emotive correlation'.

Theoretical consequences and conclusions. From a theoretical point of view, we argue that an analysis that utilizes a layer of structure dedicated to regulating the conversational interaction is more parsimonious as an analysis that is solely based on features. Moreover, in as much as the analysis is on the right track it provides us with an argument for encoding the speaker and addressee as ground holders rather than as speech act roles. Finally, another theoretical consequence of our analysis is that we need to distinguish two notions of deixis: spatial deixis (associated with location in the real world) and grounding deixis (associated with location in our mental world).

Selected references

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